**Overview of mental health and addiction adverse event review methods, types and approaches**

The following overview aims to help clinicians better understand the various adverse event review methodologies available. This is not an exhaustive list and other methodologies may exist.

The Learning Review methodology is the method promoted by Te Tāhū Hauora as it better reflects the complexity of health care and reduces hindsight bias. The other methods are included as part of a toolkit that users may choose to explore further as resource allows.

The [Healing, learning and improving from harm: National adverse events policy 2023 Te whakaora, te ako me te whakapai ake i te kino: Te kaupapa here ā-motu mō ngā mahi tūkino 2023](https://www.hqsc.govt.nz/our-work/system-safety/healing-learning-and-improving-from-harm-policy/) states that the review should reflect the eight policy principles. It is highly recommended that services consider how they bring an impartial lens to any review methodology used, as well as listening to and endeavouring to meet the needs and expectations of consumers, whānau and health workers involved.

| **Review method** | **Description** | **When to use** | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Training and resources available** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Learning Review[[1]](#footnote-2) | Designed for complex systems, particularly those involving people.A social sense-making activity that reviews an accident, incident or even normal work for clues as to where staff contribute to the safety of operations or where the system inhibits this capacity.Designed to facilitate the understanding of the factors and conditions that influence human actions and decisions by encouraging individual and group sense-making at all levels of an organisation. | Designed to be used with complex sociotechnical systems. | Elevates the voices of consumer, whānau and health workers.Seeks to understand what led people to do what they did at the time.Avoids use of ‘why’ questions.Reduces hindsight bias.Compares work as done with work as imagined.Uses those doing the work as experts in how to do the work.Informed by human factors and resilience engineering. | Use of focus groups may be time intensive. | QR code in blue on white The QR code provides a link to all resources including Learning from Harm workshops and e-learning for learning review, co-design and Human Factors |

| **Review method** | **Description** | **When to use** | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Training and resources available** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| London Protocol[[2]](#footnote-3) | A method that provides a comprehensive and thoughtful/reflective systems analysis of clinical incidents seeking areas for care improvement.Uses the incident to reflect on what it reveals about the gaps and inadequacies in the health care system.Most used and understood method in mental health and addiction (MHA) services in New Zealand. | Multifactorial complicated issues.Multiple system cross-sector involvement. | Review method is designed for use in health care.Can be scaled up or down depending on the size of the event in question.System focused.Can provide independence if the review team includes a facilitator and some members from another part of the service.  | Contributory factors have been adapted for health care from other industries rather than created for health care.Difficult to write truly systems-based recommendations without whole-of-sector input.Can be hindsight biased.Focuses on the actions of the people involved rather than the way the system performed.Uses those involved in the incident to identify what went wrong and possible improvements. Reliving the event may be traumatic for those involved in it.Implies a linear progression of adverse events. Focus is on the review team as the experts rather than those doing the work. | Training currently not available to everyone in New Zealand.. |

| **Review method** | **Description** | **When to use** | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Training and resources available** |
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| Canadian incident analysis tool[[3]](#footnote-4) | Involves a conscious and deliberate decision to focus primarily on four aspects: the agreed upon facts, key contributing factors and findings, actions for improvement (if any), and evaluation.An analysis by a person(s) with knowledge of the incident analysis process, human factors and effective solutions development in health care, with input gathered from consumers, whānau, staff and physicians local to the event as well as organisational or external experts. | Incidents that resulted in no or low harm to the consumer.Incidents primarily limited to one work area, division or department.New incidents for which a comprehensive analysis was recently completed.Initial review to determine whether a comprehensive incident analysis is appropriate. | Less resource intensive than other methods.Uses a systems approach and considers human factors. | Generally facilitated by one person, which may result in an overly narrow focus.Abbreviated scope may not capture all causal factors.Focus is on the review team as the experts rather than those doing the work. | No training currently available for this in New Zealand. |

| **Review method** | **Description** | **When to use** | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Training and resources available** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Root cause analysis (RCA)[[4]](#footnote-5)RCA2 (root cause analysis actions)[[5]](#footnote-6) | A systematic process for identifying the root causes of a problem or event and describing an approach to responding to them.Asks three questions:* What happened?
* Why did it happen?
* What can be done to prevent it happening again?
 | Uncomplicated events with few causal factors.Linear events with low complexity. | Can identify systems-based corrective actions.Carried out by a multidisciplinary team.Provides structure to the retrospective analysis of adverse events.  | Time and resource intensive.Difficult to write truly systems-based recommendations without whole-of-sector input.Implies a singular, linear cause.Can be hindsight biased.Can become focused on clinician deficit rather than systems factors.Focus is on the review team as the experts rather than those doing the work. | No training currently available for this in New Zealand.Resources available at: [Root Cause Analysis - VHA National Center for Patient Safety (va.gov)](https://www.patientsafety.va.gov/professionals/onthejob/rca.asp) |

| **Review method** | **Description** | **When to use** | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Training and resources available** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AcciMap[[6]](#footnote-7) | A systems-based technique for analysing events that occur in complex sociotechnical systems.Looks at all levels of a system, from higher governmental and regulatory levels to the actual work being carried out.Results in a graphical representation of the event. | Useful for complex events involving multiple levels of a system.To examine the relationships between the different levels of a system. | Identifies system-wide errors that led to the event.Simple to learn and use.Considers causal factors across systemic levels.Provides a visual representation of the event aetiology.Enables extended timeline of causality to be established as it considers different levels.Looks beyond the organisational level. | Can be time consuming.Quality of analysis produced is dependent on the quality of the investigation.Does not provide a method to develop corrective measures.Does not provide a structured taxonomy for error classification.Its graphical output can become hard to decipher when used for very complex events.Focus is on the review team as the experts rather than those doing the work. | No training currently available for this in New Zealand.Resources available on: <https://systemsthinkinglab.com>. |
| File/desk review | Review of a clinical record to identify issues and make recommendations to address an issue; can be used as a standalone review or diagnostic to trigger a more in-depth methodology.This may sometimes be enhanced by selected interviews and/or a review conducted by someone outside that clinical unit. | Initial review to determine whether a comprehensive incident analysis is appropriate.Usually indicated when the initial triage of an incident raises no specific issues of concern in terms of systems, processes and care delivery. | Requires minimal resources.Can be completed by an independent reviewer if required.Can be used as a triage process to decide if a more in-depth review is required. | May not gather all relevant information.Can be hindsight biased.Focus is on the reviewer as the expert rather than those doing the work. |  |
| Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)[[7]](#footnote-8) | A systematic method of identifying and preventing product and process problems before they occur. It is proactive and does not rely on something going wrong as the trigger for an investigation. | Before implementing a new process.Before altering an existing process. | Particularly useful in evaluating a new process before implementation and in assessing the impact of a proposed change to an existing process. | May not identify all potential failures.Requires large amounts of time, effort and resource.Teams may require sources of information other than personal experience and knowledge. | No training currently available for this in New Zealand.Online training available at: * <https://quality-one.com/fmea/fmea-training/>
* <https://asq.org/training/fmea-for-beginners-fmea01jpr>.
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**Other approaches to support adverse event review processes**

| **Approach to support review processes**  | **Description** | **When to use** | **Strengths** | **Weaknesses** | **Training and resources available** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework[[8]](#footnote-9) | An evidence-based framework that has been specifically developed for the health care setting.This is not a review method as such but can be used to strengthen other methods. | Describes both latent organisational failures and the error-producing conditions in which active failures occur.Gives a greater weighting to systems rather than human failings. | Developed by clinicians in a health setting. | Developed in a hospital setting so may not be applicable to out-of-hospital care settings.Does not include a consumer perspective of the causes of incidents. | No training currently available for this in New Zealand. |
| Restorative response[[9]](#footnote-10) or hohou te rongo[[10]](#footnote-11) | Restorative response between consumers and/or whānau and staff involved in care, as soon as practicable after the event.  | This can be an important process that complements adverse event review rather than replaces it.  | May mitigate the risk of compounded harm from other processes. It aligns with other processes but does not require that they are used. Therefore, it is both a stand-alone approach and a complementary one.The focus is on engagement, healing relationships, addressing harm to all parties (including affected staff) and promoting wellbeing rather than identifying cause and attributing blame. | New in health care. | Te Tāhū Hauora Health Quality & Safety Commission’s Adverse Events Learning Programme virtual adverse events training.Micro-credentials in Restorative Response are available from [Te Ngāpara Centre for Restorative Practice](https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/restorative-justice/learn-with-us)  |

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